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On the 2nd of June 1992, a majority of Danish voters said “no” to the Maastricht Treaty. 
Asked about the same time what they thought of the EC, 56% of Danish people claimed that 
membership to the EC was a good thing, 61% approved European Unification and 67% 
acknowledged their country benefited from its membership. At the time of the “No vote” 
relative to the Nice referendum, the Irish were even more euro-enthusiast with 81% claiming 
their country membership was a good thing and 83% that it benefited from this membership. 
Seven years later, still a majority of French and Dutch people considered their country 
membership as a good thing and declared their country benefited from it when voting “no” for 
the Constitutional Treaty2. Why such a discrepancy between referenda results and 
measurement of support? Could it be that the measures used since now more than forty years 
in European studies to grasp people’s support for European integration are deficient? In a 
European Union in search for legitimacy, being able to evaluate and understand citizens’ 
opinion appears crucial. Since the end of the 1960s – and particularly since the mid-1990s – 
opinions and attitudes towards European integration have been largely documented. We 
however claim in this paper that our usual measuring instruments fail short to answer a certain 
number of questions relative to citizens’ support for European integration due to their too 
static nature. European integration being a process without a clear end goal, some recent 
words emphasized the need to (re-)introduce temporal categories – temporal locations, 
sequence, speed, duration, etc. - to better understand EU policy and policies (Goetz et al., 
                                                           
1
 “France is our homeland, Europe is our future”, sentence pronounced in different occasions by François 
Mitterrand during his campaign in favor of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 
2
 Source: Eurobarometer datas (EB 37 - April 1992, EB 55 - May 2001, EB 63 - June 2005). 53% of the French/ 
67% of the Dutch thought their country benefited from its membership and 51%/77% that EU membership was a 
good thing for France/the Netherlands.  
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2009). In this paper, we claim that temporal categories are also useful tools to comprehend 
citizens’ support for European integration. More specifically, we postulate that to understand 
citizens’ support one needs not only to evaluate what they think about what the Union is 
(present) but as well their perceptions relative to where it is going (expected and desired 
future(s)). Our analyses are based both on two sets of qualitative data (interviews and focus-
groups collected at ten years distance (mid 1990 and 2006) in France and Britain) and on 
quantitative data (Eurobarometer). 
 
 
Measuring support towards European integration: a quick overview 
 
In 2005, the Hooghe and Marks’ seminal article places the number of articles written on 
public opinion about European integration at over one hundred (Hooghe & Marks, 2005). One 
can easily assume that nowadays this number has doubled. Needless is thus to say that an 
exhaustive report on the variables and the scales used to evaluate citizens’ support is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Drawing a rough sketch of the main characteristics of this literature 
helps however to pinpoint its lacks. All studies of opinions and attitudes towards European 
integration and European institutions take Easton’s political system model as a starting point 
(1965, 1975). In his work, Easton asserts that for a political system to be recognized as 
legitimate citizens’ support is needed. He distinguishes however different forms of support 
from which derive different kinds of political legitimacy. Following Easton, citizens’ support 
can be either specific – strong support from specific groups of the population, particularly 
some elites’ groups - or diffuse – lighter support shared by larger proportion of the 
population. Easton discriminates as well input from output support. When the former implies 
citizens to share a sense of belonging to the political system and a belief in the values carry by 
this system, the latter ensues from the positive evaluation by citizens of political system’s 
performances. 
Till the beginning of the 1990s, most studies on citizens’ attitudes towards European 
integration at the individual level consider that European integration benefited from the 
diffuse support of a majority of the member states’ citizens, a so-called “permissive 
consensus”. Most authors followed Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) who observed at the 
beginning of the 1970s that opinions on European integration were predominantly positive but 
based on low levels of knowledge and most expected this support to grow believing in a spill-
over from the elite to the overwhelming majority of the citizens. This model lasted for more 
than two decades. It was challenged in the 1990’s by the ambiguous results of the referenda 
on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. Support for integration seemed to be on the 
decline, as shown by Eurobarometer data. These elements were interpreted as a confirmation 
that no spill over had occurred and that the ‘permissive consensus’ was falling apart. Thus, 
some authors conclude that despite other political systems, the EU due to the lack of a 
European public sphere could only rely on output legitimacy (Majone, 1998 ; Scharpf, 1999). 
This leaded in the mid-1990s to growing interest in the evaluation by citizens of EU 
performances, particularly in the economic field (Gabel & Palmer, 1995 ; Anderson & 
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Reichert, 1996 ; Gabel, 1998) when at the same time proves were given of the antagonism 
between input support for the national political system – national identity - and attitudes 
towards European integration (e.g. Mayer, 1997; Blondel et al. 1998 ; Carey 2002 ; McLaren 
2006).  
These last fifteen years however, new results blurred this overall perception of EU 
support as driven mainly by its performances in the economic field. New studies conclude on 
the importance both of diverse output support and input support to understand attitudes 
towards European integration. As concerned the output support, authors both outline the 
declining importance of economic performances when judging the EU, particularly in wealthy 
countries (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007 ; Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010 ; Serricchio et al., 
2013) and the growing significance of other performances’ evaluations, such as the fight 
against illegal immigration or crime (Balestrini, 2012). At the same time, new results describe 
national and European identity as partially cumulative (Duchesne & Frognier, 1995; Diez 
Medrano & Gutierrez, 2001 ; Risse, 2003) although not appealing to the same sense of 
belonging (Schild, 2001 ; Bruter, 2005 ; Duchesne & Frognier, 2008) which, together with 
studies which show that attachment to certain values and trust play a role in support for the 
European integration (Tillman, 2013 ; Harteveld et al., 2013) reinforce the interest to study 
input support.  
In parallel, following the “no” vote referenda from the Maastricht Treaty to the 
Constitutional Treaty, this period of research is dominated by the notion of 'euroscepticism' 
imported from the study of political parties to the study of public opinion (Franklin, Marsch & 
McLaren, 1994; Hooghe & Marks, 2007 ; McLaren, 2007 ; Magni-Berton et al., 2009). Rather 
than observing support, scholars try to understand scepticism towards European integration 
keeping however mostly the same general frame of research. A new debate recently occurred 
opposing those who claimed what is measured through euroscepticism is the polarization of 
attitudes towards European integration - citizens’ being able to judge the European Union 
following the same ideological lines they pursue at the national level (Down & Wilson, 2008; 
Hooghe & Marks, 2009 ; de Wilde & Zürn, 2012;) - and those who consider that referenda 
results rather unveiled the ambivalence (de Vries & Steenbergen, 2013; de Vries, 2013 ; 
Stoeckel, 2013) and even the indifference of citizens towards European integration (Van 
Ingelgom, 2012 & 2014). 
Despite the proliferation of analyses of public support for European integration, 
fundamental questions remain understudied and unanswered. Part of the problem lies in the 
fact that like the apocryphal drunk looking for lost keys under a streetlight, researchers have 
been drawn by the availability of times series of Eurobarometer studies run on the behalf of 
the European Commission (Ray, 2006; Van Ingelgom, 2010 & 2012). The trend 
Eurobarometer variable on Opinions on country’s membership to the EU is for example used 
as one of the main measures of support in general and opinion on benefit from membership as 
one of the main measures of output support. Input support is mostly measured through EB 
variables on European sense of belonging and trust in the EU and its institutions. These 
variables are either used as such or combined for building scales and indexes. However they 
fell short when trying to explain differences in the nature and level of European integration 
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support between countries or results of referenda such as the French and Dutch on the 
Constitutional Treaty.  
These last years, different initiatives have been taken to offer keys to open the black 
boxes in our understanding of citizens’ attitudes on European integration. A certain number of 
studies proposed to disentangle the different dimensions of the support for the EU and Euro-
scepticism (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005 ; Wessels, 2007). When most of these studies used 
the same EB variables, others however build on different variables, such as fears linked with 
Europe and expectations about Europe, and other sets of data (Binzer Hobolt & Brouard 2010 
; Boomgaarden et al., 2011; Belot, Cautres & Strudel, 2013). At the same time, a qualitative 
turn occurred in European Studies which allow to catch sight of attitudes towards European 
integration from new angles (Belot, 2000 ; Meinhof, 2004 ; Diez Medrano, 2003 & 2010 ; 
Favell 2008 & 2010 ; Gaxie, Hubé & Rowell, 2011; White, 2011 ; Duchesne et al. 2010 & 
2013 ; Van Ingelgom, 2014). This current piece of research builds on these approaches. Using 
qualitative data offer us to observe that, if one wants to understand what Europeans think 
about Europe and whether it matters to them, one needs to focus on their perceptions of 
European integration as a temporal sequence. We would argue that European integration 
support depends not only on individuals’ judgment of the present of “Europe” but also on 
expectations for what Europe could be and evaluation of the probability that these 
expectations would be fulfill or deceptive in the future We would also assert that these 
judgment and  expectations vary according to the national context. 
We are not claiming the role plays by citizens expectations in building support was 
unnoticed before. A certain number of analysis were build on the traditional EB item tapping 
the desired speed of integration (e.g. Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000 ; Hooghe & Marks, 2005). Others 
considered citizens’ desires for a more or less integrated European Union (e.g. Lubbers & 
Scheepers, 2005). Studying identification with Europe, Bruter even claimed that to fully grasp 
it, one needs to understand “not only what it means for citizens to be ‘European’ but also 
what they want it to mean in the future” (2008: 283). We assert however that when 
considering the role of citizens’ expectations in EU support, scholars do not take sufficiently 
into account the fact that the EU is a political system permanently in the making, where time 
is a very accurate variable when trying to understand the functioning of the European political 
system and the developments of EU politics (Jerneck, 2000; Ekengren, 2002; Goetz & Meyer-
Shaling, 2009b). We claim as well that those who took expectations into account did not 
distinguished between the probable fulfill expectations and probable deceptive expectations 
which as pointed by Hix (2007) might be a useful key to understand public support. 
When putting the case for the reintroduction of Time into the study of politics, Paul 
Pierson declares: “the development of actors’ mental maps of politics would seem to be 
promising areas of study” (Pierson, 2004: 173). In this paper we claim that we should study 
the “temporal” mental maps of politics that citizens develop towards European integration in 
order to understand their attitudes. 
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Analyzing support in a temporal perspective: A Mixed-Method Approach 
 
To test our hypothesis we use three types of data, qualitative data collected at two points 
in time, 1995-1996 and 20063, and Eurobarometer data. Data collected in 1995-1996 consist 
of thorough interviews (one to three hours) with young people (15 to 30 years old) in France 
and Britain. They were collected in the framework of a PhD devoted to attitudes towards 
European integration (Belot, 2000). Data collected in 2006 consist of focus groups gathering 
people with the same social status (working class people or employees or executives or 
activists) in France, Britain and Belgium. The aim was to study how people discuss, argue, 
exchange when talking about politics using Europe as a political object common to all three 
countries (Duchesne et al., 2010 & 2013). Data are presented in appendix 14.  
 
Temporality in the speeches of French and British citizens about the EU 
 
The question of time or temporality was not part of the interviews’ and focus groups’ 
guidelines. However, when analyzing our data, we realized that when talking about the 
European Union, people, whatever their age or their social status, talked more often about 
what Europe could be or will be rather than what the European Union is5. We therefore 
decided to develop a more systematic study of the role of time in people’s opinions towards 
the EU by doing a content analysis focusing only on time. Using Atlas-Ti, a qualitative data 
analysis software, we coded all opinions on the EU and European integration focusing on 
what time they relate to in the interviewees’ mind: past, present and future6. Looking at 
European integration in the future, we realized that people talked about two different sorts of 
future: the future which they expect to happen, a likely future, and the future they hope will 
happen, a wished for future. We thus used these two codes: likely future and wished future. 
Before turning to our analysis as such, a first methodological remark seems important. 
As table 1 shows, and in terms of reanalyzing qualitative data, it is worth noting that the 
distribution in 1995-96 and 2006 are quite similar despite the fact that the two studies 
produced very different data (interviews and focus groups) and were carried out by different 
researchers at different periods and in different cities. As the coding was undertaken by others 
                                                           
3
 This paper is part of the Re-analyse project led by Sophie Duchesne on the re-analysis of qualitative data. 
4
 In both projects, the sample was built with the aim of gathering as many different attitudes towards European 
integration and kinds of discussion as possible. The samples are thus diversified samples. In this paper, we only 
use part of the data collected. We decided to focus on only two countries, France and Britain, as Belgium was 
not a case in the first study. We have coded all interviews at our disposal, that are 31 interviews in 40 (the files 
of some of the interviews’ transcripts are damaged and we haven’t find the way to restore them). We have as 
well coded half of the focus groups, 9 on 16 (for an explanation of this choice, see Duchesne et al. 2013).  
5
 This result was first found out in the research carried out by Céline Belot and the re-analyze of both studies 
confirmed it as we will demonstrate in this section.  
6
 A code is attributed any time a new idea is developed. Therefore some codes are quite short (a few words, a 
sentence) while others are as long as a paragraph. 
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researchers who had not be implicated in the data collection nor in the first analyses7, this 
similarity in the distribution is a guarantee of reliability and replicability, which are often 
missing in qualitative analyses. Of course, it is difficult from these distributions to assess the 
evolution of each category in time and this will be outside the scope of this paper. Further 
analyses would be as necessary as useful in order to further characterize this evolution, both 
in quantitative and qualitative terms. 
 
Table 1 : How people talk about Europe from a temporal point of view – 1995-96 & 2006 
 
 Total C. Belot Research CITAE Research Project 
  1995-1996 2006 
 N % N % N % 
Past 211 8.4 128 7.5 83 10.4 
Present 1137 45.3 681 39.8 456 56.9 
Likely future 437 17.4 336 19.6 101 12.6 
Wished future 727 28.9 566 33.1 161 20.1 
N  2512  1711  801  
Source: Authors’ own data. On 31 interviews and 9 focus-groups. 
 
A rough overview of the attributed codes shows that when talking about the European 
Union and European integration, people talk almost as much about the present of Europe 
(1137 codes, 45.26%) as about its future (1164 codes, 45.33%) (see table 1). The past of 
Europe is much less mentioned (8.4%). Considering that rejection of the past was the main 
justification for European construction at its start, this result is striking. Looking in detail at 
all the past codes, reference to wars are rare, and mostly cited by older people and some of 
our most politicized interviewees8. The past which people are talking about is mostly the EU’s 
past, from the Rome Treaty to the joining of Britain, from the Maastricht Treaty and 
Germany’s reunification to the CAP and the structural funds9. Moreover, when talking about 
the disappearance of conflicts between European countries such as the ones of the past, not 
only interviewees don’t build links between European integration and the end of European 
wars but they even use it as a reason not to develop European integration further, as Christelle 
(Fr) 10 a student who declares “the old quarrels … Germany, France, I think that it is over (…) 
I don’t see what it would change a European army or no European army”11. The main 
original aim of European integration is therefore not part of all judgments of Europe. The 
question of Marilyn (Fr) – “Why did they decide to create Europe, Why? (…) Were we not 
                                                           
7
 The coding was realized by Camille Brugier, PhD student at the European University Institute, and Dr. Jessica 
Sainty in the framework of the Re-analyse project. The authors are very grateful to them.  
8
 The only time the role of European integration in ending conflicts on European soil is extensively discussed 
and underlined is in the Paris focus-group with activists. 
9
 As these are references which necessitate at least a little bit of knowledge about European integration, no 
wonder that the past is much more mentioned by the most educated people.  
10
 “Fr” stands for “French”, “Br” for “British”.  
11
 Christelle (Fr) : « les vieilles querelles… Allemagne, France, je pense que c’est fini (…) je ne vois pas ce que 
ça va changer une armée unique ou pas d’armée unique. » 
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fine as we were?”12 – echoes the question asked by two British participants to the focus 
groups: “Who, who, what started the EU, where did it come from?” (Robert), “someone 
wanted to benefit from it, that’s why they did it” (Brenda). As the EU is currently in search of 
legitimacy, the fact that some of its citizens are unable to answer the question of its origins 
could be considered as a problem. 
 
Table 2: How people talk about Europe from a temporal point of view – France & UK 
 
 Total France UK 
 N % N % N % 
Past 211 8.4 130 10.3 81 6.5 
Present 1137 45.3 585 46,4 552 44.2 
Likely future 437 17.4 207 16.4 230 18.4 
Wished future 727 28.9 340 26.9 387 31 
N  2512  1262  1250  
Source: Authors’ own data. On 31 interviews and 9 focus groups. 
 
As far as the present of the EU is concerned the different words used to qualify the EU 
and the different visions of European integration which they relate to are striking. Though 
James, in the Oxford activists’ focus group, considers the EU as a “collection of nation states” 
and Paul (Fr) an employee a “superior alliance of countries”13, many talk about a 
“community”14 and a few about a “union”15. Though some use precise terms such as the 
“European Community”, “the EEC”, “the European Union”, a lot of them express their 
difficulty in explaining what kind of relationship exists between the different European 
countries. Karl (Fr), an activist considers that “we’re trying to do something together”16 and 
for César (Fr), another activist, “Europe is putting some things together”17. While Paul (Br), 
an employee, considers the EU as a “superior alliance”, for Kenneth (Br), another employee, 
it is a “wider community”. Mathieu (Fr), a Baccalaureat student, sums up the vagueness of 
Europe in these words: “this is not clear enough … there are many Europes”18. Reading all 
these different definitions or descriptions of what Europe is, it is crystal clear that when 
judging Europe, people are not all considering the same political object. For some, it is only a 
                                                           
12
 Marilyn (Fr) : « Ben oui, pourquoi déjà ils ont décidé de faire une Europe, c’est pourquoi ? (…) On n’était pas 
bien comme on était quoi j’veux dire ? » 
13
 Paul (Fr) : “une alliance supérieure de pays” 
14
 The word is used in 9 French interviews and focus groups and in 11 interviews and focus groups with British 
people. The interviewees using it belong to different age groups and status groups such as employees (Paul and 
Kenneth from Oxford, Martin and Sophie from Paris), technical pupils (Philip and Heather in Britain), 
University students (William and Helen in Britain, Patrice in France) or executives (Gabriel in Paris, Ian in 
Oxford). 
15
 The word is used again in French and British interviews and focus groups, by participants from different age 
and status groups, notably by Nina, an employee, Brenda an Oxford worker and all the participants of the 
activists’ focus group in Britain, by Claire, a technical pupil, Simon, following vocational business studies, 
Magali, Sophie and Hadia three employees in France.  
16
 Charles : « On essaye de faire quelque chose ensemble ». 
17
 César : « l’Europe c’est de mettre en commun des choses » 
18
 Mathieu : « c’est pas encore assez clair… y'a plusieurs Europe » 
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forum of discussion between European countries whereas for others it is an integrated 
political system, a European Union.  
Though both French and British people are considering different kinds of “Europe” 
when they express their opinions of the current European Union, for British people, Europe is 
also judged differently whether they believe the United Kingdom is part of it or not. Indeed, 
listening to a lot of them, whether their country is in or outside the EU is unclear. “If we don’t 
join Europe”, “if we were to take ourselves along to be into Europe”, “if they (the British 
elites) want to be part of Europe”, “when we are part of it”19, these are verbatim used by 
British interviewees. As stated by another: “The government doesn’t want us to be part of the 
European Union”20. The fact that some British citizens, not only the less educated ones, do 
not consider their country to be part of the EU is a major piece of information that should be 
taken into account when considering their judgment of the EU, as some may consider the EU 
badly not for what it does, but for what it does not do and for leaving them behind. More 
generally, if people judge the EU only for what it is or what it does, these different visions of 
what the EU is do appear as a relevant element when trying to understand people’s opinions 
and attitudes towards the EU. Considering that the EU is judged not only for what it does, but 
for what it would be, this statement appears even more essential. 
As stated before, when talking about the EU, people speak as much about its present as 
about its future. Why do people discuss the EU’s future so much? We might imagine that 
people talk of European integration as something that is going to happen rather than an 
already functioning political system depending on their level of knowledge. As shown by 
many studies, the level of education is one of the main determinants of opinions of European 
integration. As far as our hypothesis relative to time is concerned, education seems to explain 
part of the variance. In our sample, people with the lowest level of education talk more about 
the future of Europe (52.3%) than people with the highest level of education (44%). However 
what is striking is that all groups talk a lot about the future when they express their opinions 
of the European Union.  
Looking more precisely at the occurrences relative to temporality in our interviews, the 
fact that European integration appears as a process in the making is striking. Patrice (Fr), a 
history student uses the metaphor of a train to describe it and concludes: “Europe has not yet 
reached its end, far from it”21. The building metaphor is used as well by In the Paris activists’ 
focus group Deborah talks about a pathway and Dimitri adds “we need to go step by step”22. 
Laurent (Fr), an accountant, declares that “the further we go, the more we’ll talk about it” and 
he adds “I may end up knowing Europe but not when I’m forty”23. Stephanie (Br), a business 
student echoes: “everything is going to take time” and she even adds in the mid-1990s that a 
European currency would probably happen “way out of my time (…) I’ll probably be long 
gone dead”. On the contrary, for Marilyn (Fr), a hairdresser: “it’s rather going too fast”24 and 
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 Words declared by Jonathan an A level student, Charles, an elderly conservative activist, Tina, a young worker 
and Alison, a young bank executive. 
20
 Brenda, an Oxford employee. 
21
 Patrice : « l’Europe c’est pas encore achevé, loin de là ». 
22
 Dimitri : « faut y aller pas à pas ». 
23
 Laurent : « plus ça ira, plus on en parlera » - « peut-être que je connaîtrais l’Europe mais … pas à 40 ans ». 
24
 Marilyn : « ça va trop vite plutôt ». 
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Alice, a young bank executive declares: “it's changing so much at the moment, that you never 
really know what is gonna happen. You just wait and see”. Allison, a British liberal democrat 
activist asserts: “over the last ten years perhaps we’ve even gone even further ahead than 
most people thought”. In a critical speech Guy (Fr), an environmental activist accuses: “we 
have thrown caution to the wind”25, to which Jonathan (Br), Mathieu (Fr), Nathalie (Fr) and 
David (Br) answer: “we’ve got to move on” “I don’t know what we are waiting for (…) we 
need to go faster”, “it would be good if it came faster (…) I can’t wait for it to happen”26 and 
“I can’t wait for all the thing to go forward”. 
By carefully examining all the references to temporality in what was said by our 
interviewees and participants in focus groups, it becomes clear that people’s attitudes towards 
the EU not only depend on their judgment of Europe in the present, but also on what they 
expect the EU to be in the future. Precisely, as interviewees talk about a likely future and a 
wished future, their judgment reflects the closeness of the match between the two (see Figure 
1). To say it otherwise, if they wish the EU to stay as it is now and they consider it likely to 
happen, then they display positive opinions of the EU, we can sum up their attitude by calling 
them “the satisfied” [1]. On the same vein, if people wish the EU to be a federation and they 
expect it to become a federation, then again they have a positive opinion of the EU, these are 
the “forward optimists” [2]. Again, if people expect it to become less integrated than it is now 
and they wish it to be so, they have positive opinions, these are the “backward optimists” [3] .  
 
Figure 1: Temporality in positive judgments on European integration 
 
 
On the contrary, if they expect the EU to become a different political cooperation or 
political system to the one they wish for, then their opinions are negative (see Figure 2). If 
people wish the EU to stay as it is and expect it to me more integrated, then they are 
“worried” [1-2]27. If on the contrary they wish it to be more integrated and they expect it to 
stay as it is, then they are “expectative” [2-1]. If they wish it to stay as it is but they believe it 
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 Guy : « On continue d’être sans arrêt dans une fuite en avant ». 
26
 Mathieu : « je ne sais pas ce qu’on attend comme ça (…) faut aller plus vite ». Nathalie : « il faudrait que ça 
arrive plus vite. (…) vivement qu’elle soit là ». 
27
 The first number corresponding to a dotted line arrow, the second to a plain arrow (same explanation for all 
the following numbers). 
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is becoming less integrated, they will then be “disappointed” [1-3]. On the contrary, if they 
wish it to become less integrated but they expect it to stay as it is, they will be “unhappy” [3-
1]. Finally, if they wish the EU to become more integrated and they expect it to be less, than 
they will be “frustrated” [2-3] and if they wish it to be less integrated and they expect it to be 
more, they will be “angry” [3-2]. Of course these are models, in reality dissatisfaction will be 
more or less emphasized depending on the level of integration the interviewee considers the 
EU to be at the present time – from a forum of discussion to a federal Europe - and the angle 
created by the two arrows relative to the expected and wished future, the smaller the angle, 
the lesser the dissatisfaction. 
 
Figure 2: Temporality in negative judgments on European integration28 
 
 
 
We believe that the different models described are not evenly distributed between 
countries which may participate to the understanding of different types of national 
Euroscepticism. As already mentioned, when judging the EU at present time people do not all 
consider the same political object and this may depend on the national public space in which 
they live, as clearly appears in the British case. Possible expectations and wishes might also 
be dependent on the national public space. We now propose to test this new measurement 
model of attitudes towards the EU and European integration using survey data from 2006 
(Eurobarometer 66.0)29.  
 
Temporality and attitudes towards European integration: an exploratory analysis 
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 Notice that due to the difficulty of showing on one graph all the possibilities of mismatch between the likely 
future and the wished future, all arrows should be considered as exchangeable.  For example, if someone expects 
the EU to stay as it is but wishes it to be more or less integrated, then to represent his/her opinions, arrow 1 
should be a plain arrow and arrows 2 or 3 dotted lines.  
29
 We choose the 2006 data set as this is the year when the focus groups have been carried out. Moreover the 
questions of ‘EU role in daily life’ were not asked in 1995 and 1996. 
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In order to measure temporality and in particular the importance of the perception of the 
EU’s future, we have first chosen to look at the role of the EU in daily life both in terms of 
expectation and preference for the future using the following questions:  
a) In your opinion, in five years' time, will the European Union play a more important, 
a less important or the same role in your daily life? [EU role in daily life - 
Expectation] 
b) And, in five years' time, would you like the European Union to play a more 
important, a less important or the same role in your daily life? [EU role in daily life 
– Preference] 
In both cases, responses have been graduated from 1 (‘more important’) to 3 (‘less 
important’), the value 2 being the median category. This question enables us to operationalize 
the perceptions of the importance of the EU in the future. An analysis of bivariate correlations 
between these two questions and the classic membership ‘good/bad’, country benefit and 
image of the EU indicators reveals that people’s attitudes towards the EU indeed depend on 
what they expect the EU to be in the future and, even more importantly, about what they 
desire it to be.  
 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Different indicators of Support for Integration – 
France and UK, 2006 (F/UK) 
 
 EU 
Membership 
– Good/Bad 
EU 
Membership 
– Benefit 
EU 
Membership 
– Image 
EU Role in 
daily life – 
Expectation 
EU Role in 
daily life –  
Preference 
European 
Citizenship 
Future 
Feeling 
EU Membership – 
Good/Bad 
- .59 / .70 .71/.72 .20 / .10 .31 / .35 .36 / .29 
EU Membership – 
Benefit 
- - .57 / .67 .09 / .09 .25 / .32 .22 / .28 
EU Membership – 
Image 
- - - .21 / .07 .31 / .37 .34 / .30 
EU Role in daily 
life – Expectation 
- - - - .38 / .43 .20 / .12 
EU Role in daily 
life – Preference 
- - - - - .24 / .20 
European 
Citizenship Future 
Feeling 
- - - - - - 
Source: Eurobarometer 66.0, 2006.  
Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level.  
 
As can be seen in Table 3, the Pearson correlations between ‘EU Role in daily life – 
Expectation’ and the membership indicators vary by between .07 and .21 whereas the 
correlations between ‘EU Role in daily life – Preference’ and these indicators are much 
higher, around .30 both in France and in UK. In both countries, the results for the latter 
variable are very similar. However, it is noteworthy that in the British case, the Pearson 
correlations are very different when speaking of expectation or preference. Indeed, when 
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looking at both variables of membership ‘Good/bad’ and ‘Image’, the discrepancy between 
expectation (respectively .10 and .07) and preference (respectively .35 and .37) is very high in 
the British case. This result echoes our qualitative analysis which underlined the specificity of 
the UK.  
Moreover, it seems that the classic identity indicator (‘European Citizenship future 
feeling’, ranging from 1 ‘European only’ to 4 ‘National only’) presents very similar results to 
the ‘EU role in daily life – Preference’ variable. It can be hypothesized that the future 
belonging variable reveals as much about attitudes towards the future as about a developing 
European sense of belonging. In the British case, the wished future indicator records an even 
higher score (.35 versus .29) when comparing Pearson correlations for the classic membership 
question (‘Good/Bad’). Even if these bivariate analyses require confirmation by a multinomial 
regression analysis, one can hypothesize that the preference on the role of the EU in daily life 
is no more imperfect than the identity variable, which has been largely used in the literature. 
Moreover, in the British case, it seems that the preference variable has a stronger correlation 
with the membership indicators than the future belonging variable, probably indicating a less 
emotional relationship in the UK than in the French case.  
In order to make sure that the expectations and preferences for the role in daily life are 
indeed linked to the EU and not simply to the evaluation of personal expectations, we have 
run a factor analysis. Empirically, the distinction between the personal and national on the one 
hand and the European level on the other can be accessed through the following factor 
analysis using the 2006 survey (Eurobarometer 66.1).  
 
Table 4: Factor analysis of expectations for the future – By country, 2006 
 
 France United Kingdom 
Component Component 
1 2 1 2 3 
EU role in daily life – Expectation  0.745  0.732  
EU role in daily life – Preference  0.712 
 
0.759 
 
European citizenship future belonging  0.624 
 
0.524 
 
Expectations: life in general30 0.765  0.678 
 
-0.397 
Expectations: personal job situation31 0.749  0.669  -0.353 
Expectations : financial situation32 0.815  0.729 
 
 
Expectations : employment situation 33 0.770  0.640 
 
0.535 
Expectations: economic situation34 0.756  0.637 
 
0.592 
Explained variances (R² after rotation) 38,35% 19,05% 23,32% 19,16% 18,66% 
Source: Eurobarometer 66.0, 2006 (samples weighted by country).  
Note: Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
 
                                                           
30
 What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the 
same, when it comes to your life in general? 
31
 What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the 
same, when it comes to your personal job situation?  
32
 What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the 
same, when it comes to the financial situation of your household?  
33
 What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the 
same, when it comes to the employment situation in (OUR COUNTRY)? 
34
 What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the 
same, when it comes to the economic situation in (OUR COUNTRY)? 
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The factor analysis measures the degree to which items are tapping the same concept. If 
respondents answer in similar ways to questions related to different level of expectations, it 
implies that these future situations, here expectations and preferences for a personal, national 
and European future, are not considered as being distinct by respondents. The factor analysis 
shows that the eight indicators mentioned above represent two separate attitudinal dimensions 
in France, whereas in the UK there are three dimensions. The meaning of a factor is, in 
general, determined by the items which have the most weight. Thus we chose to retain the 
items linked to expectations about life in general, economic situation, financial situation, 
employment situation and personal job situation to explain the first factor both in France and 
in the UK. Their meaning is not ambiguous as they are all related to personal expectations 
about the future in personal and national terms. The second dimension clearly expresses the 
expectations about the future of the EU. One can thus conclude that citizens are able to 
distinguish between personal and national levels and the European level, and isolate their 
expectations about the future of the EU from their own situation and the economic and 
employment situation of their countries.  
 
Temporality in positive and negative judgments on European integration: a typology 
 
 In this last part, we would like to go back to the typology developed from the 
qualitative analysis of our data distinguishing between ten profiles of citizens: the forward 
optimist, the satisfied, the backward optimist, the expectative, the frustrated, the worried, the 
disappointed, the angry, the unhappy and the uncertain. As a further exploratory analysis, we 
wish to examine whether variation exists in the distribution of these profiles when comparing 
our two countries. The distributions of the ten profiles are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5: Distribution of the ten profiles – France & UK, 2006 
 
 France United Kingdom 
Forward Optimist (E+ & P+) 28.8 16.9 
Satisfied (E= & P=) 23.6 20.6 
Backward Optimist (E- & P-) 3.0 6.7 
Expectative (E= & P+) 16.7 6.1 
Frustrated (E- & P+) 3.1 1.5 
Worried (E+ & P=) 6.2 7.9 
Disappointed (E- & P=) 0.8 1.5 
Angry (E+ & P-) 5.4 16.7 
Unhappy (E= & P-) 2.2 5.8 
Uncertain (DK) 10.8 16.4 
Source: Eurobarometer 66.0, 2006. Authors’ own calculation.  
 If our models offer an accurate way to measure attitudes towards European integration, 
we should find as in all other studies, that France and the UK present notable differences in 
their distributions. As expected, the proportion of forward optimists is higher in France where 
they represent 28.8 percent of the population whereas in the British case, this percentage is 
only 16.9. The second largest group is the satisfied in both countries followed by the 
expectative in France and the angry in the UK. In this latter case, this means that a 
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considerable proportion of the British expect that the EU will become more important but 
would like the EU to play a lesser role in their everyday life. On the contrary, in France, the 
expectative are characterized by an expectation of a status quo though they would prefer the 
EU to take a more important role in the future.  
 Before turning to our conclusion, we propose to have a look at the link between the ten 
profiles and the evaluation of membership as it is a classic indicator of support of European 
integration. The percentages are shown in Table 6. We have distinguished between the 
positive, neutral and negative preferences for the role of the EU in daily life as we have 
shown that there is a stronger correlation between this variable and support for European 
integration than the others.  
 
 
Table 6: Temporality and positive and negative judgments on European Integration – France 
& UK, 2006 
 
 Good Thing Neither Good nor 
Bad 
Bad Thing 
Positive preferences    
Forward Optimist (E+ & P+) 76.7 18.0 5.3 
Expectative (E= & P+) 51.5 36.3 12.2 
Frustrated (E- & P+) 44.9 24.9 30.2 
Neutral preferences    
Worried (E+ & P=) 50.7 36.7 12.7 
Satisfied (E= & P=) 45.1 40.6 14.3 
Disappointed (E- & P =) 35.9 36.4 27.8 
Negative preferences    
Angry (E+ & P-) 22.6 24.9 52.5 
Unhappy (E= & P-) 14.1 35.7 50.2 
Backward Optimist (E- & P-) 25.7 34.7 39.6 
Uncertain judgments (DK) 33.5 42.5 24.0 
Source: Eurobarometer 66.0, 2006.  
Note: Pearson correlation significant at 1%; R=.368 
 
As shown in Table 6 and as expected, the citizens wishing the EU to play a more important 
role in their daily life are characterized by a higher percentage of positive evaluations of the 
membership of their country. This percentage declines as the evaluation of the expected 
situation becomes more negative. This is also true for the citizens who have a neutral position 
on their preferences for the future role played by the EU. However this is no longer true when 
considering the negative preferences. Indeed, in this category of response, the most positive 
respondents are those who expect the EU to play a lesser role and wish this to happen, 
confirming our qualitative analysis. For a quarter of these citizens, the two negative 
evaluations of the likely and wished future of the EU lead them to support European Union 
membership as it is.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
As the historical sketch has underlined, the evolution of the field has been largely dependent 
on contextual events such as the difficult ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the French and 
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Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and certainly more recently the Eurozone 
crisis. In this precise context of constant uncertainty, the Eurozone crisis has made even more 
unmistakably clear the importance of taking into account the future of the European 
integration process. Relying on exploratory analysis of both longitudinal qualitative and 
quantitative data, this paper claimed that temporality is important not only to understand 
institutions and public policies, as shown by recent studies (Goetz & al., 2009) but also to 
comprehend citizens’ attitudes towards European integration and the different countries’ 
levels of support for the EU. Attitudes towards European integration derive partly from 
different perceptions of what the Union is but even more importantly of where it is going both 
in terms of expected and desired future(s). 
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Appendixes 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: List of British interviewees 
 
 Age Status Town 
    
Jonathan 17 High-school pupil, 
A levels 
Durham 
Clare 17 Technical pupil, design Durham 
Steven 18 Mechanic, apprenticed Durham 
Helen 18 Student – English studies Glasgow 
Heather 18 Technical pupil, tourism Guildford 
Stephanie 
 
19 Vocational business 
studies 
Guildford 
 
Philip 19 Technical pupil, business Durham 
Benjamin 19 Technical pupil, 
mechanic for the 
aerospace industry 
Guildford 
William 21 Student L3  
Political Science 
London 
Andrew 22 Vocational business 
studies 
Leeds 
Debbie 
 
23 Design, vocational 
training 
Guildford 
Alice G. 25 Bank executive  Durham 
Tina 27 Secretary Guildford 
David B. 29 Mechanic Guildford 
Alexander 29 PhD in Physics, 
Unemployed 
Durham 
Jennifer 30 Former worker, catering 
vocational training 
Durham 
Christine 30 Unemployed, 
administrative vocational 
training 
Durham 
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Appendix 2: List of French interviewees 
 
 Age Status Town 
Gilles 16 Technical pupil Vizille 
Mathieu 18 High-school pupil,  
A levels 
Grenoble 
Kébira 18 No qualification, looking 
for a training course 
Boulogne-sur-mer 
Claire 18 Technical pupil Grenoble 
Davy 19 Technical pupil Vizille 
Simon 20 Vocational international 
business studies 
Boulogne-sur-mer 
Nathalie 20 Vocational business 
studies 
Courchevel 
Mélanie 21 Vocational international 
business studies 
Calais 
Christelle 22 Student L3  
foreign languages 
Grenoble 
Patrice 24 Student L3 
History 
Boulogne-sur-mer 
Jessi 24 Employee, non-
permanent contract 
Boulogne-sur-mer 
Marilyn 27 Employee, Hairdresser Grenoble 
Christophe 29 Caterer, self-employed Grenoble 
Laurent 30 Employee, accountant Grenoble 
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Appendix 3: List of Focus groups  
 
(Nick)name Sexe Age Education Profession 
Left  
right Vote Referendum EU belonging Identity Origin 
PARIS                    
PAR Workers 1                    
Albert M 42 Brevet/BEPC Naturopath (unemployed) 5 NV NV G World White 
Ghislaine F 26 Brevet/BEPC Care assistant 4 L. Jospin NV G NE Afro-Caribbean 
Geoffrey M 33 CAP ou BEP Print worker 5 NV No NGNB NE White 
Lionel M 42 Brevet/BEPC Security officer DK O. Besancenot No G EN White 
Yasmina F 35 Brevet/BEPC Homemaker DK NV NV B NE Maghreb 
Habiba F 41 Bac général Homemaker (and secretarial work for family business) 4 L. Jospin No NGNB Other Maghreb 
PAR Employees 1           
Laetitia F 23 Bac + 2 Sales engineer 6 J. Chirac NV B N White 
Magali F 28 Bac + 2 Receptionist/telemarketing DK J. Chirac NA NGNB NE White 
Victor M 30 Bac + 2 Higher technician, logistics 2 N. Mamère N G E White  
Patrice M 33 Bac tech/pro Butler DK NV NV NGNB NE White 
Hadia F 36 Bac + 3 to + 5 Project leader, advertisement (unemployed) 3 NV NV G NE Maghreb 
Clelia F 24 Bac + 2 Receptionist/ illustrator 5.5 NA NV ? ? White 
PAR Employees 2           
Paul H 35 Bac +2 pharmaceutical sales representative 5 NA No B NE White 
Pablo M 43 Bac tech/pro. Secretarial work (unemployed) 7 J. Chirac No G N Other European 
Samira F 26 Bac +2 Restaurant manager 5 L. Jospin No  B N Maghreb 
Aline F 41 Bac +2 Sales engineer (unemployed) 6 J. Chirac NV B E White 
Martin M 46 Bac+2 Graphic designer (unemployed) 3 L. Jospin Y G NE White 
PAR Activists 1                    
César M 35 Bac +3 to +5 Lawyer (unemployed) 6 J. Chirac Y NGNB Other Afro-Caribbean 
Karl M 21 Bac +3 to +5 Student (engineer) 8 NV N G NE White 
Cheik M 40 Bac tech/pro Municipal agent 6 J. Chirac NV G NE Maghreb 
Pierre-Antoine M 23 Bac +3 to +5 Communications manager (party) 4 F. Bayrou Y G NE White 
Déborah F 30 Doctorat Doctoral student 5 L. Jospin Y G EN White 
Guy M 59 Bac +3 to +5 Coach personal development / finance expert 2 N. Mamère N G N White 
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Dimitri M 48 Bac +3 to +5 Principal private secretary, (arrondissement mayor) 3 L. Jospin Y G NE White 
PAR Managers 1           
Francis M 30 Bac + 3 to + 5 IT professional 7 J. Chirac Y G EN White 
Inès F 39 Bac + 2 Fashion designer 7 J. Chirac N G NE White 
Fabienne F 26 Doctorat Doctoral student 3 M.G Buffet N B World White 
Gabriel M 59 Bac + 3 to + 5 Printing advisor 3 L. Jospin Y G NE White 
Toufik M 24 Bac + 3 to + 5 Engineer  4 NV NV G NE Maghreb 
Serge M 42 Bac + 3 to + 5 Charterer accountant 5 L. Jospin N B EN White 
Céline C 31 Bac + 3 to + 5 translator 4 NV N G NE White 
OXFORD                    
OXF Workers 1                    
Mina F 48 A-Level, AS-Level  Private care assistant 7 Labour DK NGNB World Black Asian  
Robert M 32 GCSE or O'Level Tankdriver (disabled) 7 NV Y G NE White 
Ron M 31 VCE, AVCE, NVQ L3 Technician (car industry) 5,5 Labour DK NGNB N Black Asian  
Mary F 54 GCSE or O'Level School cleaner 7 Ind. Y NGNB N White 
Brenda F 37 GCSE or O'Level Post person and receptionist DK  NV N NGNB N White 
OXF Employees 1                     
Nina F 31 Foundation d°, NVQ L4 Care support worker 3 Labour Y G EN White 
Pat F 37 A-Level, AS-Level  Admin/secretarial work 4,5 Labour DK G N Black  
Mel F 51 A-Level, AS-Level  Receptionist (part time) 5,5 DK DK G NE White 
Kenneth M 51 A-Level, AS-Level  Office support worker 5,5 LibDem Y G NE White 
Mike M 45 A-Level, AS-Level  Office manager 6 NV N B NE White 
Kamal M 24 BA, BSc, degree Team leader in catering business 5 Ind N G N Black Asian  
OXF Activits 1                    
Bethany F 79 Foundation d°, NVQ L4 Councillor 5 Labour Y NGNB NE White 
Allison F 57 Primary school Housewife and volunteer 4 LibDem Y G NE White 
Charles M 71 A-Level, AS-Level 
District councillor (ex IT consultant and finance 
advisor) 6 Cons Y B N White 
Annabel F 26 BA, BSc, degree Campaign manager 3,5 Labour Y NA NA White 
James M 61 Master degrees Company director 8 Cons N B Other White 
Lewis M 70 PhD or Dphil  County councillor (ex health advocacy) 1 Green N DK World White 
OXF Managers 1           
Sundai M 36 BA, BSc degree Store manager 7 Labour Y G NE Black 
Alexander M 39 A-levels, AS level Bank manager 8 Cons N NGNB N White 
24 
 
Derek M 37 PhD or Dphil Lecturer and researcher 3 Cons DK NGNB NE White 
Ian M 38 BA, BSc degree Salesman 7 Cons N NGNB N White 
Bansuri F 42 VCE, AVCE, NVQ L3 Personal development trainer 5,5 NV N NGNB N Black Asian 
 
 
